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INTRODUCTION 
Environmental regulation issues surrounding Australia's mining sector have received 
relatively little attention from environmental law scholars. 1 This neglect has meant 
there has not been a concerted attempt to draw lessons for environmental law and 
regulation from the experience of this sector. This thesis aims to contribute to that 
field of scholarship with an examination of the regulation of Australia's burgeoning 
coal seam gas (CSG) industry. 
CSG activity has rapidly expanded in the last five years, with industry and 
governments extolling gas as essential for the transition from coal to renewable 
energy.2 Approximately $80 billion will be invested in expanding CSG development 
in the coming years.3 Industry activity has been most heavily concentrated in 
Queensland4 with approximately 80 per cent of that State's consumer gas now 
1 But see Michael Briody and Tim Prenzler, 'The Enforcement of Enviromnental Protection 
Laws in Queensland: A Case of Regulatory Capture?' (1998) 15(1) Environmental and 
Planning Law Journal 54-71; Drew Hutton, 'Mining and the Enviromnent in Queensland: 
Where the Law Begins and Enforcement Fails - Regulatory Capture and Implementation 
Failure' (1999) 6(2) Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 149-173; 
David Brereton, 'Self-Regulation of Enviromnental and Social Performance in the Australian 
Mining Industry (2003) 20(4) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 261-274. 
2 NSW Government, Submission No 642 to General Purpose Standing Committee No 5, 
Inquiry into Coal Seam Gas, 30 September 2011, 4; Queensland Government, Submission No 
358 to Senate Standing Committee on Rural Affairs and Transport, Inquiry into the 
Management of the Murray Darling Basin, June 2011, 3. 
3 Paddy Manning, 'Energy Analyst Turns Up Heat On New Gas Projects', The Sydney 
Morning Herald (online) 28 October 2011 <http://www.smh.com.au!enviromnent/water-
issues/energy-analyst-turns-up-heat-on-new-gas-projects-201ll027-1 mm53.html>. 
4 G Barker and S Slater, 'The Increasing Significance of Coal Seam Gas in Eastern Australia' 
(Paper presented at PESA Eastern Australasian Basins Symposium III, Sydney, 14-17 
September 2008) 1. 
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comprised of CSG.5 The New South Wales (NSW) CSG industry is less advanced, 
but the State looks set to experience a similarly large boom.6 
Confronting this growth, however, are serious environmental concerns. Recent studies 
have cast doubt on the view that gas-fired electricity carries significantly less global 
warming potential than coal. 7 CSG extraction also poses serious threats to 
groundwater. Scientists warn that these risks are uncertain, yet may be widespread 
and irreversible. 8 Relative to conventional natural gas, CSG extraction involves far 
more environmentally intrusive practices, including extraction of large amounts of 
groundwater and in some circumstances, deliberate disturbance of geological systems 
through hydraulic fracturing ('fraccing').9 Fraccing involves pumping large amounts 
of water, sand and chemical fluid into gas wells at high pressure, causing fissures in 
the coal seam. 10 This allows trapped gas to move to the surface where it can be 
captured.11 
5 Arif Syed et al, 'Australian Energy Projections to 2029-30' (Report, Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resources Economics, 18 March 2011) 45. 
6 NSW Government, Submission No 642, above n 2, 7. 
7 This is because new industry practices for extracting gas are highly energy-intensive and 
create substantial fugitive emissions: Robert W Howarth, Renee Santoro and Anthony 
Ingraffen 'Methane and the Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of Natural Gas from Shale 
Formations' (2011) 106 Climatic Change 679-690; Tom ML Wigley, 'Coal to Gas: the 
Influence of Methane Leakage' (2011) 108 Climatic Change 601-608. 
8 National Water Commission (NWC), 'Coal Seam Gas and Water' (Position Statement, 
December 2010) 1-2; Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 
(CSIRO), 'Coal Seam Gas: Challenges, Benefits and Risks of CSG Production' (Factsheet # 
5, (July 2011) 1-2; University of Sydney Hydrology Research Laboratory, Submission No 
553 to NSW Legislative Council, Inquiry into Coal Seam Gas, 14 September 2011, 1-3; 
Email from Gavin Mudd to Charlotte Hanson (11 September 2011). Mudd is an 
environmental engineer in the Department of Civil Engineering, Monash University. 
9 NWC, above n 8, l; CSIRO, 'Coal Seam Gas Hydraulic Fracturing' (Factsheet # 3, July 
2011) I. 
1
° CSIRO, 'Challenges, Benefits and Risks of CSG Production', above n 8, 1. 
[[ Ibid. 
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Regulators and government officials defend the growth of the industry in the face of 
serious uncertainty with the asserted adoption of 'adaptive management' programs.12 
It is proposed that through the ongoing collection of data from existing projects, new 
information will be used to improve strategies for managing the uncertain 
. I . fth . d I' env1ronmenta impacts o e m ustry. -
This thesis argues that despite the adoption of adaptive management to address 
regulatory concerns, much CSG activity in NSW and Queensland is taldng place in a 
context of regulatory failure. That is, regulators appear to be serving industry 
purposes at the expense of the public interest in environmental protection. 14 
Regulators have set aside the precautionary principle, a cardinal consideration in the 
regulation of environmental risks, and approved projects without thorough 
environmental impact assessment (EIA). Further, specific statutory provisions 
applying to CSG do not adequately address the environmental risks it poses. 
12 An adaptive management regime has been introduced in Queensland: see, eg, Queensland 
Government, 'Adaptive Environmental Management Regime for the Coal Seam Gas 
Industry' (Factsheet, Department of Environment and Resource Management, 201 l) 1-2. 
NSW has not followed suit with a State-wide adaptive management policy, however this 
seems likely to occur in the near future: a senior regulatory officer stated in interview that 
there is uo other viable policy option: Interview with senior officer, Department of Trade and 
Investment, Regioual Infrastructure and Services (DTIRIS) (Telephone Interview, 15 
September 2011). The notion of adaptive management was also employed in NSW in 
February 2011 in the approval decision for a major CSG development at Gloucester: see 
below, Part Two(Il:NSW). 
13 Queensland Government, Adapiive Environmental Management Regime, above n 12, 2. 
14 Martin Lodge, 'Competition, Innovation and Regulation: The Regulatory State and Policy 
Failure - Regulatory Regimes in Britain and Germany (Paper presented at 5lst Political 
Studies Association Conference, London School of Economics, Manchester 10-12 April 
2001). 
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It is also contended that adaptive management has been used by regulators and 
governments to falsely legitimate15 the regulation of the industry. Adaptive 
management literature suggests it is an inappropriate regulatory technique where 
potentially irreversible impacts are involved. 16 Even aside from this threshold issue, 
regulators do not appear to be complying with adaptive management requirements. 17 
When invoked in this way, adaptive management seems to be a politically convenient 
but legally and environmentally inadequate justification for allowing industry growth 
in the face of serious uncertainty. 
This thesis therefore proposes that to ensure an adequate level of environmental 
protection, there is a critical need not only for law reform in relation to the CSG 
industry, but regulatory reform as well. 
In exploring these issues, the existing legislative scheme that applies to CSG is 
considered. Although revie'.Ying the legal framework provides insights into the 
normative principles with which regulatees are expected to comply, such as approach 
reveals little about how the law is implemented and the underlying political and 
institutional forces influencing its implementation. 18 Hence, this thesis is chiefly 
concerned with exposing the 'law in action';19 that is, how regulatory agencies in two 
States have engaged with the CSG industry and the reasons for their approach. 
" L{lgitimate in the sense used by Jilrgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Beacon Press, 
1975). 
16 C S Holling, Adaptive Environmental Assessment and .Management (John Wiley & Sons, 
1978) 8. 
17 See below, Part One(II:Adaptive Management). 
18 Tim Bonyhady, Places Worth Keeping: Conservationists, Politics and Law (Allen & 
Unwin, 1993) x. 
19 This term derives from the work oflegal realists such as Roscoe Pound, ~Law in Books and 
Law in Action' (1910) 44 American Law Review 12-36. 
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l CO?\'TRIBUTION TO THE RESEARCH FIELD 
At the time of writing, a thorough search revealed that no peer-reviewed articles on 
the regulation of Australia's CSG industry have been published. The regulation of a 
comparable industry in the United States - shale gas extraction -- is discussed in 
several journal articles.20 However, their focus is the laws applying to the industry, 
not institutional and political factors influencing regulation. 21 
The influence of political and institutional factors on the work of regulators is a vital 
consideration in the context of mining regulation in Australia, as studies have shown 
regulatory agencies tasked with overseeing this sector are often predisposed to serving 
industry interests at the cost of environmental protection. 22 This thesis contributes to 
the study of environmental regulation with original research into the political and 
institutional dynamics influencing the approach of those regulating the CSG industry. 
In contrast to some regulatory failure studies,23 it considers regulation from an ex ante 
viewpoint, 24 before the possible outcomes of the alleged regulatory failure can be 
fully assessed. It is hoped that this forward-looking analysis identifies areas of 
20 See, eg, Hanruth Wiseman, 'Untested Waters: the Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and 
Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation' (2009) 20 Fordham Environmental Law 
Review 115-195; Emily C Powers, (2011) 19 'Fracking and Federalism: Support for an 
Adaptive Approach that Avoids the Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons' Journal of Law 
and Policy 913-971; Brian J Smith, 'Fracing the Environment?: An Examination of the 
Effects and Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing' (2011) 18 Texas Wesleyan Law Review 129-
148; Michelle L Kennedy, 'The Exercise of Local Control Over Gas Extraction' (2011) 22 
Fordham Environmental La:w Review 375-392. 
21 But see Wiseman, above n 22, 115, 169-181, who examines how industry and political 
influences have affected the federal regulation of fraccing in the United States. 
22 See, eg, Neil Gunningham, 'Negotiated Non-Compliance' (1987) 9 Law and Policy 69·95; 
Briody and Prenzler, above n 1, 54-71; Hutton, above n 1, 149-173; Public Accounts 
Committee, Parliament ofNSW, Report on the Forestry Commission (1990) 126-8. 
23 See, eg, Thomas McGarity, 'MTBE: A Precautionary Tale' (2004) 28 Harvard 
Environmental Law Review 281, 282. 
24 Jon Stem, 'The Evaluation of Regulatory Agencies' in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and 
Martin Lodge (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford Univeristy Press, 2011) 
223, 224. 
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weakness in the regulatory approach and legislation so that law and policy may be 
reformed to better protect the environment. 
II METHODOLOGY 
Primary research was required to gain insight into the regulatory approach and the 
political and institutional forces affecting it. Internal government documents, 
legislation and policy statements were reviewed. Interviews (11 in total) were 
conducted with a range of subjects, including state departmental officials, 
environmental NGOs, and industry and company representatives. These provided 
opportunities to explore and seek explanations for regulatory issues in greater depth 
than written correspondence would allow. There was a marked difference in the 
responsiveness of regulatory agencies in NS\\' and Queensland to interview requests. 
Queensland's environment authority required all questions to be submitted via email 
so that written responses eould be prepared to questions, whereas NSW regulators 
were more willing to speak candidly about their work. The relative openness ofNSW 
officials allowed deeper analysis with respect to some aspects of the research, 
particularly the institutional influences on the regulatory approach. 
The author also undertook field research for three weeks in far Northern NSW (a CSG 
hotspot) in order to obtain a practical understanding of the environmental issues 
surrounding the industry. As well as engaging with stakeholders, time was spent on a 
participant observation basis in a community legal centre that provides advice to 
Northern Rivers residents regarding the legal issues arising from CSG activity.25 
25 This research was undertaken from 27 June 2011 to 18 July 2011 in Lismore NSW under 
the supervision of solicitor Sue Higginson. 
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III SCOPE 
A Jurisdiction 
CSG exploration has occurred in a number of Australian states and the Northern 
Territory, however because most activity is concentrated in Queensland and NSW, 
this thesis focuses on industry regulation in those States. The map below shows the 
location of CSG reserves and projects. 26 
The Commonwealth currently has a very limited role in CSG regulation, through the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) ('EPBC Act'). 
Where a project has, will have, or is likely to have, a significant impact on one or 
26 Geoscience Australia, Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism and Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 'Australian Energy Resource Assessment' 
(Report, l March 2010) 98. Note 'EDR' is an abbreviation of Economic Demonstrated 
Resources and 'PJ' denotes petajoules. 
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more prescribed matters of national environmental significance,27 approval from the 
Commonwealth Environment Minister is required under Part 9 of the Act.28 
Commonwealth oversight of the industry29 is an important issue, but is beyond this 
paper's ambit. 
B Environmental Impacts 
The environmental problems to which the CSG industry gives rise are wide-ranging.30 
The focus of this thesis is groundwater impacts, as these present the greatest level of 
uncertainty and the most intractable regulatory challenges. Key risks relate to aquifer 
diversion, depletion and contamination. 
27 Matters of national environmental significance are listed in pt 3 div 1 of the EPBC Act and 
include, eg, World Heritage property (s 12) and threatened species and ecological 
conununities (s 18). 
28 The Commonwealth has approved three major CSG projects in Queensland in the last year 
aud several more projects are currently being assessed under the EPBC Act: see Department 
of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, Public Notices: 
R~ferrals (22 October 2011) <http://www.environment.gov.au/cgi· 
bin/epbc/epbc ap.pl?name"'public notifications&limit=730&text search=coal+seam+gas>. 
29 -- - -· Independent aud Greens parliamentarians have attempted to increase Commonwealth 
scrutiny of the CSG industry under the EPBC Act by providing for mining operations 
impacting on groundwater to be made a matter of national environmental significance: see 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment (Mining, Petroleum and 
Water Resources) Bill 2011 (Cth) s 240, introduced by independent Tony Windsor, and 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment (Protecting Australia's 
Water Resources) Bill 2011 (Cth) s 24D, introduced by Larissa Waters of the Greens. 
30 These include contamination of waterways and land, biodiversity and heritage loss, land 
clearing and bushfire risks: Nari Sabukar, Environmental Defender's Office (EDO) NSW, 
Submission No 359 to NSW Legislative Council, Inquiry into Coal Seam Gas, 12 September 
2011, 8. Fraecing has also been linked to earth tremors in the United Kingdom: Peter Ker, 
Phillip Wen and Ruth Williams, 'Fracking Shock Reignites Concern', The Sydney Morning 
Herald (online), November 5 2011 <http://www.smh.com.aufenvironment/fracking-shock· 
reignites-concem-20111104-ln02e.html>. 
8 
I Aquifer Diversion and Depletion 
To desorb CSG from coal, groundwater must first be pumped up from coal seams (a 
process called 'dewatering').31 On average approximately 300 gigalitres of 
groundwater will be extracted in Australia each year by the industry for the next 25 
years; in comparison, the total extraction from the Great Artesian Basin for all 
purposes (including agriculture) is 540 gigalitres per year. 32 
The National Water Commission (}.'WC) predicts that the extraction of water in these 
processes will affect the flow and water levels of connected surface and groundwater 
systems, including those of the Great Artesian Basin and the Mun·ay Darling Basin.33 
This is because gas and water extraction depressurise coal seams, which can alter 
pressure in adjacent aquifers and diminish sur:fuce water flows. 34 The long-tem1 
effects of groundwater extraction are uncertain35 and may be irreversible.36 
2 Aquifer Contamination 
Fraccing can also cause aquifer eontamination. Some of the chemicals injected into 
coal seams for fraccing are highly toxic. 37 There is a risk that these chemicals may 
contaminate surrounding aquifers if, during drilling or fracturing, an aquifer becomes 
" National Water Commission, above n 8, l. 
32 National Water Commission, above n 8, 1. 
33 Ibid. 
}4 Ibid. 
35 Ibid; CSIRO, 'Challenges, Benefits and Risks of CSG Production', above n 8, 1. 
36 Email from Gavin Mudd to Charlotte Hanson (11 September 201 !). 
Ji Mariann Lloyd-Smith and Rye Senjen, 'Hydraulic Fracturing in Coal Seam Gas Mining: 
the Risks to Our Health, Communities, Environment and Climate' (Report, National Toxics 
Network, June 2011) 10-14. 
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connected with the coal seam into which chemicals have been injected.38 Even if 
connectivity does not occur, the geological distnrbance caused by fraccing can 
mobilise organic compounds already present in subsurface rocks, including 
hydrocarbons such as benzene, toluene, ethyl-benzene and xylene (BTEX).39 If this 
occurs, there is a risk that these compounds could mix with groundwater.40 
IV STRUCTURE 
In light of these environmental threats, Part One explains how the precautionary 
principle applies to the CSG industry and explores the origins and uses of adaptive 
management techniques to address environmental uncertainty. Part Two describes and 
critiques the legislative framework that applies to the CSG industry and presents 
evidence of the regulatory approach in Queensland and NSW. Part Three integrates 
evidence from Part Two with regulatory theory to provide possible explanations for 
the regulatory approach to date. Recommendations for addressing some of the 
shortcomings in the regulatory approach and legislative framework are then provided. 
38 
'NWC, above n 8, l; fraccing has caused connectivity between an aquifer and a coal seam in 
!he Surat Basin, Queensland: see below Part Three(I:Reasons for the Approach). 
>
9 Lloyd-Smith and Senjen, 'Hydraulic Fracturing', above n 37, 5-6. BTEX has also been 
used as a drilling agent for CSG activity: at 5. 
40 A company operating an underground coal gasification project in Dalby, Queensland, 
recently reported BTEX contamination at six to 15 times higher than Australian drinking 
water standards in bores surrounding its activities, which has increased concerns over indirect 
contamination caused by fraccing. See National Toxics Network, 'Gas Industry Plays Down 
BTEX Levels in Groundwater' (Press Release, 29 August 2011) I. 
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PART ONE: RECONCILING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
A:.~D ADAPTIVE MANAGEJ\1ENT 
I TIIE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
The precautionary principle is a cardinal element of the overarching concept of 
ecologically sustainable development (ESD) that informs environmental law. The 
principle holds that '(w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.'41 Judicial interpretation of the 
principle emphasises that the level of precaution required is inversely proportionate to 
the likelihood of risk involved.42 This means that where there is a high degree of 
potential damage, a low level of certainty about the threat will warrant precaution.43 
The principle is widely incorporated as an objective and decision-making 
consideration in Acts applying to CSG activity.44 However, if the precautionary 
principle is triggered with respect to a particular development, it does not have a 
prohibitory effect;45 rather, it remains open for decision-makers to approve an activity 
41 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment (1992) [3.5.1], as codified in legislation, 
eg, Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991 (NSW} s 6(2)( a): 'if there are 
threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty should 
not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation'. 
42 Telstra v Hornsby Shire Council [2006] LEC 133 ('Telstra v Hornsby Shire Council') 
fl46], [166]-[167]. ~,Ibid. 
44 ESD is the stated object of the environmental impact assessment law applying to CSG 
projects in Queensland, the Environmental Planning Act 1994 (s 3). Section 5 of this Act 
requires decision-makers to exercise their power 'in the way that best achieves the objects of' 
the Act. In NSW, ESD is an object of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 
(s S(a)(vii}), under which environmental impacts ofCSG projects are assessed in that State. 
45 Telstra Corporation Limited v Hornsby Shire Council [I 79]-[180]. 
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based on economic imperatives.46 For the CSG industry, the financial stakes are high: 
in Queensland the CSG to Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) industry \\ill add over $3 
billion to Gross State Product (GSP) and provide $850 million in government 
royalties annually.47 In NSW, CSG is estimated to increase GSP by $1 billion.48 
This thesis accepts the scientific evidence indicating that the environmental risks to 
groundwater are serious and potentially irreversible. 49 Given the magnitude of 
potential environmental impacts, CSG activity warrants a high degree of precaution, 
despite the economic imperatives. 50 Evidence of the regulatory approach in 
Queensland and NSW presented in Part Two suggests that the principle has not been 
given adequate weight, since economic development has been unduly prioritised over 
emironmental protection. Although this presents a prima facie situation of regulatory 
failure, the justification for rejecting the precautionary principle -···· that adaptive 
management will address the environmental threats posed by the industry must 
be considered to deteimine whether it provides a viable alternative to applying the 
precautionary principle. 
46 David Farrier and Elizabeth Fisher, 'Reconstituting Decision Making Process and 
Structures in Light of the Precautionary Principle' (Paper presented at the Precautionary 
Principle Conference, Institute of Environmental Studies, University of New South Wales, 
20-21 September l 993) 1. 
47 Queensland Government, Submission No 358, above n 2, 6. 
48 NSW Government, above n 2, 7. 49 " . 
See above n 8. 
50 Telstra v Hornsby Shire Council [146], [166]-[167]. 
5
' See above n 12 and accompanying text 
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11 ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 
Adaptive management is an explicitly experimental technique52 that has been applied 
to the management of replenishing natural resources such as fisheries and wildlife. 53 It 
involves close integration of scientists and policymakers in the development of 
environmental systems models that are adjusted in response to changing conditions. 54 
Adaptive management reconceptualises environment regulation by incorporating 
scientists while activities are carried out, as opposed to merely in the initial EIA. 55 
The technique is theoretically consistent with the precautionary principle, because it is 
not intended for use in situations where environmental impacts of an activity are 
irreversible.56 Given scientists' concerns over the irreversibility of CSG impacts,57 it 
is arguable that the industry is an inappropriate subject for adaptive management ab 
initio. A thorough review of the literature revealed no examples of adaptive 
management being invoked in relation to new techniques of resource extraction that 
are known to cause potentially irreversible harm. The claims to be applying adaptive 
management to CSG extraction in Australia appear to be unprecedented in this way. 
lnvoking adaptive management to justify CSG project approvals is also legally 
problematic, as the policy may conflict with legislation. If a decision-maker applies a 
blanket poliey that removes their discretion to consider project applications according 
52 Kai N Lee, 'Appraising Adaptive Management' (1999) 3(2) Ecology and Society [13] 
<http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol3/iss2/art3/inline.html>. 
53 See, eg, Carl Walters, Adaptive Management of Renewable Resources (Blackburn Press, 
1986); ibid [35]. 
54 Holling, above n 16, l 4-15. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid, 8, 11; Carl Walters, 'Challenges in Adaptive Management of Riparian and Coastal 
Ecosystems' (1997) 1(2) Ecology and Society [45] 
<http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/voll/iss2iartl/>. 
57 See above n 8. 
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to criteria prescribed by legislation, the decision may be invalid because it is 
inconsistent with the discretion pennitted by the Jaw.58 Adaptive management does 
not have the status of an environmental law principle, 011 a par with the principles of 
ESD, including the precautionary principle. It is not provided for in EIA legislation 
applying to the CSG industry.59 Since the precautionary principle is incorporated as a 
decision-making consideration into the legislative framework for the CSG industry,00 
if adaptive management is applied inconsistently with the precautionary principle to 
approve projects, there is an argument that such approvals may be invalid. 61 
Aside from these threshold problems with applying adaptive management to justify 
the CSG industry, it is necessary to consider how adaptive management should be 
implemented. A set of minimum requirements must be met: data collection must be 
comprehensive; new data must be entered into scientific models for predicting 
impacts so as to reduce uncertainties over time; and the expctirnenter should be 
responsive to new information that comes to hand. 62 Evidence presented in the next 
Part suggests that these requirements have not been consistently complied -with in 
CSG regulation to date. 
58 Green v Daniels (1977) 13 ALR I ('Green v Daniels'), 9. 
59 Adaptive management is incorporated as a principle into several environmental laws and 
regulations in Australia, eg, Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Regulation 2000 (Cth) sch 8, referring to International Union for Conservation of Nature 
reserve management, and Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) ('Water Management Act') 
s5(2)(h). Some provisions of the Water lvfanagement Act apply to CSG activity in NSW, 
however much of the industry is exempt from its licensing requirements: see EDO (NSW), 
'Mining Law in NSW' (Discussion Paper, June 2011) 26, 29-30. 
60 See above n 44 and accompanying text. 
61 -Green v Daniels, I , 9. 
62 Alastair T Iles, 'Adaptive Management: Making Environmental Law and Policy more 
Dynamic, Experimentalist and Learning' (1996) I 0 Environmental Planning and Law 
Journal 288, 290-2. 
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PART Two: THE LAW IN ACTION 
This Part evaluates the relevant environmental laws and their implementation in the 
studied jurisdictions in terms of project assessment, monitoring and enforcement. 
Since the extent of law reform addressing the unique environmental problems posed 
by the CSG industry varies between Queensland and NSW, the analyses for each 
State focns on different legal and regulatory issues within these broad areas. For 
Queensland, where the indnstry is larger and there is more specialist legislation for 
CSG activity, the provisions for monitoring of groundwater impacts are focused upon. 
For NSW, where applicable law is in a state of flux,63 particular attention is given to 
regulators' approach to assessment of CSG projects and issues surrounding the 
regulatory role of the statutory Environmental Protection Authority (the Office of 
Environment and Heritage (OEH)). 
I QUEENSLAND 
CSG activity in Queensland requires authorisation under the State's EIA law, the 
Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) ('EP Act').64 
The EP Act categorises CSG activities as either Level 1 or 2 depending on the risk of 
environmental harm.65 The State's large-scale CSG projects and all projects involving 
fraccing are classified as Level 1 activities.66 Since Queensland's CSG industry is 
63See below, Part Two(ll:NSW). 
64 A Resource Authority must also be obtained under the Petroleum and Gas (Production and 
Safety) Act 2004 (Qld). Since more onerous environmental protection obligations are 
provided for in the EP Act, its provisions are considered here. 
65 EP Acts 309C. 
66 EP Acts 309C; Environment Protection Regulation 2008 (Qld) cl 23(1 ), sch 5. 
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now dominated by large-scale production projects,67 the focus here is Level 1 
provisions. 
A Level 1 Environmental Authorities 
Applicants are required to complete an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for 
Level 1 aetivities if the administering authority (the Chief Executive of the 
Department of Environment and Resource Management (DERJv1))68 forms the opinion 
that an EIS is required. 69 However, an EIS is not required under the EP Act if the 
Resource Authority70 relating to the application is declared by the Coordinator-
General of the Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation 
(DEED I) to be a 'significant project'. 71 The Coordinator-General decides whether an 
EIS is required. 72 Ifit is (which is 'almost invariably' the case),73 they determine the 
terms of reference for the EIS. 74 Based on this assessment, the Coordinator-General 
can stipulate conditions for the Environmental Authority, 75 and any conditions 
imposed by DERM must not be contrary to these. 76 
These ElA provisions create an institutional decision-making arnmgement where 
environmental safeguards may be circumvented in favour of economic benefits. The 
overriiling authority of the Coordinator-General in imposing conditions on major 
67 EDO Northern Queensland, 'Coal Seam Gas Production and Regulation: What You Should 
Know' (Factsheet, January 2011) 5. 
""EP Act sch 4. 
69 EP Acts 310E (I). 
70 See above n 64 and accompanying text. 
7l EP Acts 310E(5). 
72 State Development and Public Works Organisation Act 1971 (Qld) ('State Development 
Act') s 26(1). 
73 Interview with Lindsay Delzoppo, Director Environmental Impact Assessment, DERM 
(Telephone Interview, 31October2011). 
74 State Development Acts 30(1). 
-, 
• State Development Acts 47C(l ), EP Acts 31 OO(S)(a). 
76 EP Act s3100(5)(b). 
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CSG projects undennines DERt\.i's authority as a regulator. The limitations of 
DERM's regulatory powers with respect to deemed significant projects are not, 
however, unique to the CSG industry or to Queensland. Rather, they reflect a 
common theme in Australian environmental law identified by Bonyhady and 
Macintosh et al, of the EIA process for major projects prioritising economic 
development. 77 
B Groundwater Modelling 
Under amendments to the Water Act 2000 (Qld) ('Water Act') introduced in 
December 2010,78 the Queensland Water Commission (QWC) is now responsible for 
collecting data on groundwater impacts to be used for the development of a regional 
groundwater model.79 The model covers the declared 'cumulative management area' 
(CMA)80 of the Surat Basin.81 
While the development of a regional groundwater model is necessary for achieving an 
adaptive management framevvork, it is very late in the overall life-span of the industry 
to be creating a model, considering CSG exploration began in Queensland in the 
1980s. 82 An ex-energy industry hydro geologist described the initiative as 'an 
afterthought', as it was introduced once the State's three largest CSG projects were 
approved last year. 83 
77 Tim Bonyhady and Andrew Macintosh (eds), Mills, Mines and Other Controversies 
(Federation Press, 2010). 
78 Water and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (Qld). 
79 Water Acts 370(1)(a); Explanatory Memorandum, Water and Other Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2010 (Qld), 12. 
'
0 Water Act ss 397, 400, 405, sch 4. 
81 QWC, 'Coal Seam Gas Groundwater Management' (Factsheet, 28 March 2011) 1. 
82 DEED!, 'Queensland's Petroleum: Exploration and Development Potential' (Report, 
February 2011) 12. 
83 Manning, above n 3. 
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There are also problems with the rigour of data collection for the model. The QWC is 
only required to monitor impacts on groundwater quantity, not quality changes.84 
Given the risks that CSG activity poses to the quality of groundwater, particularly 
where fraccing is used, 85 monitoring water quality changes is critical. 86 CSG 
companies are also required to collect baseline data (for water quality and quantity) to 
be provided to the QWC,87 but exploration activity does not trigger the requirement 88 
Considering that CSG exploration can involve extensive groundwater extraction 
through dewatering, 89 this means that modeling conducted with this data may not take 
into account true groundwater baselines. 
There is some evidence that the CSG industry had a pivotal role in drafting the law 
for groundwater modeling. The Explanatory Memorandum for the Water Act 
amendments makes clear that industry successfully lobbied for exploration activities 
to be exempt from baseline assessments.90 In a meeting in Toowoomba in October 
2010, DER.t\1 officers acknowledged that Hopgood Ganim, one of the major firms 
representing the CSG industry in Queensland,91 was involved throughout the drafting 
84 Water Act ss 37l(a), 376. 
85 CSIRO, 'Hydraulic Fracturing', above n 9, 2; Lloyd-Smith and Senjen, 'Hydraulic 
Fracturing', above n 37, 2-20. 
86 Interview with Gavin Mudd (Telephone Interview, 1November2011). 
8' 
' Water Acts 394(a); QWC, above n 81, 2. 
88 Water Acts 397; Explanatory Memorandum, Water and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 
2010 (Qld) 47. 
89 Interview with senior officer, Queensland Water Commission (felephone Interview, 21 
October 2011). 
90 Explanatory Memorandum, Water and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2010 (Qld) 47. 
91 Hopgood Ganim, Resources and Energy (2011) 
<http://www.hopgoodganim.eom.au/Expertise!Resources-and-Energy.aspx>. 
18 
of the Water Act arnendments.92 The Explanatocy Memorandum states that select 
NGOs and local councils were consulted on the draft Bill, however it does not 
mention Hopgood Ganim's involvement.93 In light of the concessions in the Act, this 
may suggest the firm had a less formalised but influential role in consultation. 
Jn addition to these informational gaps, there is an institutional barrier to the 
successful implementation of adaptive management under this framework: the QWC 
has no decision-making role, including in the assessment of new projects.94 This 
could mean scientific knowledge of impacts of the industry will carry limited weight 
in the regulation of the industry, and that management will not be appropriately 
adaptive. 
C Liability and Enforcement 
The EP Act contains a suite of traditional sanctions for addressing environmental 
harm, ranging from environmental protection orders, to offence provisions for causing 
pollution.95 
It is ar,guable, though, that there is no appropriate sanction for what might become the 
industry's most damaging environmental legacy96 - depletion and diversion of 
aquifers caused by depressurisation. There is not enough scientific knowledge to 
91 Email from Anne Bridle to Charlotte Hanson (4 November 2011). The meeting was held at 
DERM's office on 8 October 2010. 
93 Explanatory Memorandum, Water and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2010 (Qld) 44. 
94 Interview with senior officer, QWC (Telephone Interview, 21 October 2011 ). 
05 
• EP Act chs 7, 8. 
96 Email from Gavin Mudd to Charlotte Hanson (11 September 2011). 
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know whether these impacts can be reversed.97 Furthermore, if the impacts take 
decades or centuries to be realised,98 the chances of liability being successfully 
imposed on responsible companies are slim, as many companies may have dissolved. 
Showing causation between a company's operations and diversion and depletion of 
groundwater is also likely to be problematic, because water is extracted from so many 
different points in major underground water sources such as the Great Artesian 
Basin.99 
Additionally, existing enforcement provisions may prove inadequate in relation to 
contamination of aquifers. The Manager of Queensland's LNG Enforcement Unit has 
suggested that 'clean-up notices' 100 could be used when companies cause aquiter 
contamination. 101 Clean-up notices can be used to require operators to 'prevent or 
minimise contamination' or 'mitigate or remedy the effects of the incident' .102 
However, if an aquifer is contaminated through mobilisation of hydrocarbons or 
connectivity caused by fraccing, clean up directions may be impossible to fulfill. The 
preferred method for addressing connectivity is to fill gaps with cement, !03 but if toxic 
compounds have already entered an aquifer, controlling them may be impossible.104 
In addition to these legislative problems, regulators have facilitated the CSG industry 
through a conciliatory approach to law enforcement. Comments from the Manager of 
97 Email from Gavin Mudd to Charlotte Hanson (11 September 2011). 
98 NWC, above n 8, 3. 
99 Chris Moran and Sue Vink, 'Assessment of Impacts of the Proposed Coal Seam Gas 
Operations on Surface and Groundwater Systems in the Murray-Darling Basin' (Report, 
Centre for Water in the Minerals Industry, University of Queensland, 29 November 20 I 0) 22. 
100 See EP Act ch 7 pt SR 
101 Steve Austin interview with Andrew Brier (Radio Interview, 30 June 2011 ). 
102 EP Act s 363H{l )(a),(b ). 
103 Email from DERM to Charlotte Hanson (30 September 2011 ). 
'
04 Email from Mariann Lloyd-Smith to Charlotte Hanson (30 August 201 l ). 
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the LNG Enforcement Unit suggest that strict application of 1he law is not the 
regulatory objective. In discussing the use of sanctions for non-compliance by CSG 
operators, 1he officer referred to accidental breaches of Environmental Authorities as 
'slap on the wrist sort of stuff' .105 If companies can only expect a 'slap on the \Nrist' 
for breaching a license condition, the deterrent effect of environmental Jawl06 will be 
seriously impaired. 
This liberal approach seems to extend to instances of unambiguous non-compliance. 
Auditing conducted from 1 January to 30 June 2011 revealed 21 incidents of non-
compliance, which included several that appear to be deliberate: excessive vegetation 
clearance, controlled release of produced water to the environment, and exceeding 
water discharge quantity limits. 107 However each incident only attracted either a 
warning notice or no enforcement action at all. 108 
II NEW SOCTH WALES 
The legislative framework under which gas exploration and production is regulated in 
NSW has remained largely unaltered despite growth of the CSG industry. However 
some reforms to CSG regulation were introduced in May 2011 109 and a broad 
105 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 'Gas Enforcement', BreaAfast, 15 September 2011 
(Andrew Brier). 
1°" In Bentley v BGP Group (2006) 145 LOERA 234, Preston CJ noted at [139]-[140] that 
sentencing for environment offences 'must serve the purpose of general or public deterrence' 
and that 'nominal' sanctions will not deter people from committing environmental offences. 
These considerations are relevant to regulators, since they play a part in environmental law 
enforcement. 
rn? DERM, 'CSG/LNG Compliance Plan 2011 Update: January 2011 to June 2011' 
(Factsheet, October 2011) 3-4. 
108 Ibid 4. 
109 Brad Hazzard, 'NSW Government Adopts Rigorous Strategic Approach to Regional Land 
Use Planning' (Media Release, 21 May 2011) 1-2. 
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planning system review is undenvay with further changes anticipated for CSG 
regulation.U0 
A Environmental Impact Assessment 
In NSW, CSG activity requires approval under the Environmental Planning and 
Assessment Act 1979 (NS\¥) ('EP& A Act'). 111 
1 State Significant Development 
Until October 2011, different EIA requirements applied to exploration and production 
activities under the EP&A Act, as discussed below. However, all new CSG projects 
(exploration and production) with over five wells are classified as State Significant 
Development (SSD) under Part 4, Division 4.1.112 Environmental assessment for SSD 
is undertaken by way of an EIS, 113 but since the regulation stipulating EIS 
requirements has not yet been exhibited, it remains to be seen how rigorous it will be. 
The EIA process for exploration and production projects under the previous planning 
system is considered here because existing applications will be assessed under it.114 
Examining the EIA processes applied to CSG activity to date also helps illustrate 
underlying issues with the regulatory approach to the industry. 
110 Brad Hazzard, 'Overhaul of the Planning System Heralds a New Era in NSW' (l'vfedia 
Release, 12 July 2011) 1; NSW Government, above n 2, 19. 
111 Licensing under the Petroleum (Onshore) Act 1991 (NSW} is also required for CSG 
projects but as is the case with Queensland, the more onerous environmental protection 
provisions are contained in the NSW EIA law, the EP&A Act. For details of the BIA 
requirements contained in the Petroleum Act, see EDO NSW, above n 59, 32-33. 
112 See draft State Enviromuental Planning Policy (State and Regioual Development} 2011 cl 
8(1), sch 1s6. 
113 EP&A Acts 89G(a}. 
m EDO NSW, above n 59, 24. 
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2 Exploration 
Applications for exploration activity made before October 201 l are generally 
assessed under Part 5 of the Act.115 The determining authority (the Minister for 
Planning)ll6 must consider likely environmental impacts, which are generally 
identified by applicants in a 'Review of Environmental Factors' (REF) in accordance 
'vith s !11.117 If exploration is likely to significantly affect the enviromnent, the 
applicant must complete a more rigorous EIS for review by the Minister. 118 
CSG exploration is considered by determining authorities not to involve significant 
environmental impacts, so Eli\. occurs by way of a REF.119 However, the use of REFs 
for exploration seems to be based on assumptions about the significance of impacts 
that are not supported by evidence and that have not been tested in court. 120 
REF-based assessments are simpler for applicants to complete, but evidence suggests 
they are not necessarily thorough. The OEH notes that 'companies do not need to 
undertake comprehensive environmental assessments to determine what 
115 Development consent under Part 3A of the EP&A Act is required for exploration activities 
within closely-settled local government areas: State Environmental Planning Policy {Major 
Developme11t) 2005 ('SEPP (.Major Development} cl 6(1)(a), sch 1 (as repealed by State 
Environmental Planning Policy (Major Development) Amendment Act 2011 (NS\V). 
u6 EP&A Acts 110 
m The term 'review of environmental factors' is not used ins 111; REFs are a product of 
internal policy. 
ll8 EP&A Acts l 12; see Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000 (NSW) cl 
72, sch 2 for EIS criteria. 
119 Interview with senior officer, DTIRIS (Telephone interview, 18 September 2011 ). EDO 
NSW has found no instances of an EIS being required for CSG exploration activities: see 
Nari Sahukar, EDO, above n 30, Annexure l, 5. 
120 In Timbarra Protection Coalition Inc v Ross Mining NL (l 999) 102 LGERA 52, the failure 
to include a species impact statement with an application for development consent was held to 
be a jurisdictional fact capable of judicial review. Arguably, a failure to provide an EIS in an 
application for CSG exploration activity would also be reviewable as a jurisdictional fact. 
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environmental values are present on exploration or lease areas, or what impacts they 
will have on the environment.' 121 For instance, the REF for CSG drilling in the 
Sydney suburb of St Peters refers to serious risks of groundwater contamination due 
to the permeability of the alluvial sands in the area, but no further hydrogeological 
data to predict possible impacts of the project was included in the REF (Appendix 
I). 122 The Department of Industry and Investment ('DII')123 approved the project 
despite its own finding that the resilience of aquifers to cope with the impacts of 
drilling was uncertain, as was the potential for reversing impacts (Appendix II). 124 
The approval of the St Peters drilling demonstrates how the REF-based assessments 
can leave fundamental questions about environmental impacts unexamined. 
Even when fraccing - which may pose considerable environmental risks-125 occurs 
in exploration, EIA is completed by way of a REF. Metgasco's 2010 approval for 
fraccing126 in the Clarence Moreton Basin demonstrates that REF-based assessments 
for fraccing, are not comprehensive. In August 2010, the company requested 
permission to amend its REF to allow fraccing. 127 In response, the D II sought 
information about groundwater impacts. It requested that the company '[d]iscus [sic] 
potential impacts to aquifers, [and] include mitigation measures to prevent aquifer 
contamination'. 128 The company's reply was '[s]ince any aquifers are behind the 
121Department of Environment and Climate Change (as OEH then was), Minute for Executive 
Meeting, EPRG Coal Mining Project (28 May 2008) 39. 
122 Macquarie Energy, Review of Environmental Factors (February 2010) 30, 38. 
123 DII is now the Department of Trade and Investment, Regional Infrastructure and 
Transport. 
124 DII, Part 5: Analysis of the Extent of the Impacts During Construction and Operation (24 
March 2010) 3. 
125 CSIRO, 'Hydraulic Fracturing', above n 9, 1. 
126 This approval pertained to fraccing for conventional gas, not CSG. 
127 Email from Todd Goebel to Catherine Karpiel (3 August 2011 ). 
128 Email from Catherine Karpiel to Todd Goebel (3 August 2011 ). 
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cemented steel casing, there is no perceivable impact to groundwater [as] a result of 
the fracture stimulation' .129 No information was provided about the hydro geology of 
the area where the fraccing was to take place. Additionally, the amount of fraccing 
fluid to be used in the operations and the amount of water that would be extracted 
from the coal scam were not disclosed (Appendix III). 
Despite these oversights, permission to fracture the well was granted within two days 
of the DII receiving from the company responses to the questions posed, and without 
any consultation with the OEH.130 The email correspondence points to a lack of 
precaution in EIA and heavy reliance on industry to act responsibly. 
3 Production 
Applications for CSG production made before October 2011 are assessed under Part 
3A of the EP&A Act. 131 The EIA criteria for assessing such projects were developed 
on a case-by-case basis in Director-General's Requirements (DGRs),132 and the 
Minister for Planning was the final decision-maker. 133 As is the case for Level 1 CSG 
activities in Queensland, there was no automatic legislative requirement for an EIS. 
The lack of rigour in regulators' approach to EIA for CSG activities appears to extend 
to production projects. The recent approval for Australian Gas Light Company 
129 Email from Todd Goebel to Catherine Karpiel (3 August 2011). 
130 Interview with senior officer, OEH (Telephone Interview, 26 September 2011). 
m EP&A Acts 75B(1 )(a) (as repealed by Environmental Planning and Assessment 
Amendment (Part 3A Repeal) Act 2011 sch I), State Environmental Planning Policy (Major 
Development) 2005 (SEPP (Major Development) cl 6(l)(a), sch l (as repealed by SEPP 
(f:[ajor Development) Amendmem Act). . . 
- EP&A Acts 75F(2). Mm1stenal gwdelmes could be issued under s 76F(l) but none were 
in place for CSG projects: see EDO NSW, above n 59, 24. 
133 EP&A Acts 750. 
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(AGL)'s Gloucester gas field is a case in point. The Planning Assessment 
Commission (PAC) oversaw this assessment because AGL made political donations 
during the NSW election. 134 Part of the assessment was a hydrogeology study 
designed to aid design of a groundwater monitoring network to detennine potential 
impacts of the development.135 
That study highlights a series of infoimation gaps and notes the need for a numerical 
model to better determine the project's impacts.136 Nevertheless, the PAC 
recommended the project be approved.137 It acknowledged that the company failed to 
do all it could to assess environmental impacts:138 
Some geological uncertainty is, of course, inevitable in underground gas extraction 
and mining operations. But, a greater degree of definition of the geology and 
groundwater modelling in the Environmental Assessment and supporting documents 
would have given a greater degree of <lSsurance that risks [to groundwater] were 
negligible ... The Commission nevertheless accepts the position, implicit in the 
Department's recommendation for approval, that it is possible to develop the gas 
field by adaptive management. 
The PAC's decision is currently subject to judicial review in the NSW Land and 
Environment Court. 139 The case raises issues with the approval being granted when 
essential matters of consideration were deferred. 140 
'""Leonie Lamont, 'Court Challenge for AGL Project', The Sydney Morning Herald (online) 
18 October 2011 <http://www.smh.com.awbusiness/court-challenge-for-agl-project· 
20111017-lltcy.html>. 
m Sylvie Ogier-Halim, 'Gloucester Basin Stage I Gas Field Development Project: Prelimary 
Groundwater Assessment and Initial Conceptual Hydrogeological Model' (Report., SRK 
Consulting, July 20 I 0) I. 
136 Ibid 46-48. 
m NSW PAC, 'Concept and Project Application for Gloucester Gas Project' (22 February 
2011) 6. 
138 Ibid 13. 
139 Barrington-Gloucester-Stroud Preservation Alliance Inc v Planning Assessment 
Commission (Land and Em~romnent Court, Proceeding Number 11/40144, Pain J). 
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i; 
The approval of the Gloucester gas field, in the face of recognised significant 
uncertainties and inadequate modeling, is illustrative of how adaptive management 
can be misused to justify the industry's expansion. Since adaptive management 
models require comprehensive data input to properly predict environmental 
impacts, 141 approving a project without first collating this data into a model 
undermines a basic requirement of the technique. 
B Groundwater 
Unlike in Queensland, the NSW Water Resources Commission is not involved in 
overseeing the CSG industry142 and no regional groundwater modeling to monitor 
CSG impacts is reported to have been undertaken. 
c The Role ofthe OEH 
The Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 (NSW) (POEO Act) provides 
that the OEH is the regulatory authority for pollution control in NSW.143 However, 
despite the potential groundwater and other pollution caused by the CSG activity,144 
in practice the Office has a very limited regulatory role. This is because internal 
policy dictates that the OEH's regulatory ambit only extends to CSG projects for 
which an environment protection license (EPL) has been issued under the POEO 
140 Barrington-Gloucester-Stroud Preservation Alliance Inc, 'Points of Claim', in Barrington-
Gloucester-Stroud Preservation Alliance Inc v Minister for Planning and Infrastructure, 
Proceeding Number 11/40144, filed 5 Julv 2011 5-14. 
141 Iles, above n 62, 291. · 
142 Manning, above n 3, 81. 
'
43 POEO Acts 6(1 ). 
144 See above n 30 and accompanying text. 
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Act. 145 For CSG projects, an EPL is only required if more than five petajoules of 
methane or 100 tonnes of petroleum products or fuel are produced per year. 146 
The high threshold for POEO licensing means that AGL's Camden Gas Project is the 
only CSG operation in NSW holding an EPL.147 Yet projects below this threshold 
may give rise to significant environmental impacts. A CSG project in the Pilliga State 
Forest, for example, encompasses 92 wells, 32 kilometres of buried gas flow line, a 
small power station, 13 uncovered water impoundments, a reverse osmosis unit, and a 
permit to discharge up to one megalitre of treated water per day to an ephemeral 
waterway. 148 However there is no EPL for the project, 149 and so the OEH does not 
regnlate the activity. 150 
Internal emails obtained through a call for papers in the NSW Parliament in 2011 
starkly illustrate the circular reasoning that informs the OEH's involvement in CSG 
activities. In September 2010, the Director of the North West Branch of the OEH 
acknowledged in relation to a query about the contents of fraccing fluid, the ' [ OEH] 
has very limited experience and involvement' .151 In another email, the same Director 
145 Interview with senior officer, OEH {Telephone Interview, 26 September 2011). An EPL 
cannot be refused where it is required for carrying out an approved Part 3A project or SSD: 
EP&A Acts 75V(e) (as repealed by Environmental Planning & Assessment Amendment (Part 
3A Repeal) Act 2011 sch!); EP&A Acts 89K(l)(e).1bis is a broader issue with pollution 
control licensing that could not be explored in depth here. 
146 POEO Act ss 5, 43, 48, sch 1 cl 31. 
147 Interview with senior officer, OEH (Telephone Interview, 26 September 2011 ). 
148 Warwick Jordan, Pepe Clarke and Carmel Flint, 'Under the Radar. How Coal Seam Gas 
Mining in the Pilliga is Impacting Matters of National Environmental Significance' (Report, 
The Wilderness Society, Nature Conservation Council ofNSW and Northern Inland Council 
for the Environment, June 2011) 44-46. 
149 OEH, List of Licenses (9 May 2011) 
<http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/prpoeo/licences.htm>. 
150 Interview with senior officer, OEH (Telephone Interview, 26 September 2011 ). 
151 Email from Joshua Gilroy to Alison Cochrane (27 September 2010). 
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noted that the OEH 'won't know [what the sum total of pollution incidents to date 
resulting from CSG projects is] because the majority of activity is under exploration 
licenses' .152 
Thus, the OEH is not heavily involved in regulating CSG aetivity because the 
environmental consequences are not considered to exceed a certain magnitude. 
However, there is no statutory requirement for determining authorities to consult with 
the OEH over a CSG approval, even though the OEH has more specialist 
environmental expertise. 153 However, since January 2011 internal policy has provided 
that OEH has an advisory role in the assessment of CSG projects. 154 The OEH can 
request further information about any aspect of a project, 155 but its influence over 
decisions about the environmental significance of impacts and the scale of assessment 
appears limited. An OEH officer acknowledged in interview that the environmental 
assessment for CSG projects is conducted well before the OEH considers the 
activity. 156 
OEH's lack of involvement in regulating CSG projects means that compliance and 
enforcement functions are left to the agencies that provide approvals. These agencies 
take a conciliatory approach to enforcement, as discussed below. 157 Futthermore, the 
resources devoted by other departments to monitor compliance are minimal. For 
instance, the Department of Primary Industries (DPI), which is responsible for 
regulating most major developments in the State, has six staff dedicated to 
152 Email from Joshua Gilroy to Alison Cochrane (28 September 2010). 
153 Interview with senior officer, DPI (Telephone Interview, 12 September 2011). 
154 Interview with senior officer, OEH (Telephone Interview, 26 September 2011). 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid. 
157 See below, II(D: Enforcement). 
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compliance, three of whom are responsible for monitoring all of the Department's 
projects except coal mining in the Hunter Valley (to which the other three compliance 
staff are dedicated). 158 
D Enforcement 
The EP&A Act contains a wide range of enforcement measures. 159 However the same 
problems arise as in Queensland with the apparent inability of existing legislation to 
address the unique environmental impacts posed by the industry. As these issues have 
been discussed, a case study of the regulatory response to alleged non-compliance by 
one CSG company is considered here. 
The DII was notified on 17 August 2010 of an eyewitness report of AGL dumping 
water into pasture close to a waterway in the Hunter V alley.160 The eyewitness took 
samples of the water and had them independently tested, with results showing that the 
water contained a number of contaminants.161 These results were sent to the DTI. 162 
The Incident Investigation Report (Appendix N) reveals that DH attended the scene 
of the incident but despite the pool of dumped water still lying in the paddock, 163 did 
not take its own water samples. The Report suggests that the DI! relied on the 
company's previous water analysis, which only tested for salinity: 164 
158 Interview with senior officer, DPI (DPI Office, Sydney, 9 September 2011). 
159 EP&A Act pt 6. 
160 DH, 'Complaint of Hunter Valley Protection Alliance: Summary of Findings of Incident 
investigation-AGL Energy: PEL267' (September 2010) [Ll]. 
161 Ibid [3.2]. 
162 Ibid [3.1]. 
163 Ibid [2.2]. 
164 Ibid [2.5]. 
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AGL's consultants had monitored water quality on the lucerne paddock and took 
samples from the pool in the creek. Analytical results obtained by [DII] of samples 
taken on the 23"' and 24'" July 2010 confirmed the high electrical conductivity (EC) 
of the water. 
It is unclear whether the DII even relied on water samples taken from the site of the 
incident: the report goes on to state that 'the water sample dates [for testing of water 
captured by the witness] were the 30th July and 2"d August, at least three days after 
the water was released into the paddock'. 165 The Dll was not aware of when the 
incident occurred, 166 but if it was only three days before 30 July, then the results it 
obtained (from the consultant's samples taken on 23 and 24 July 2010) may not have 
been from the same water source as that which was dumped - there was no way for 
the DII to be sure. 
The DII was more doubtful of the witness's integrity than that of the company, 
deciding not to pursue the matter of other contaminants in the water, ' [ d]ue to 
potential contention arising from the integrity of sampling, sample containment, 
source of the contaminants and the chain of custody of the samples' .167 According to 
the report, the samples went from the eye'INitness, to the HVP A, and then to two water 
testing laboratories. 168 
The report does acknowledge that 'a volume of approximately 120,000 litres of highly 
saline water was air lifted from the aquifers from the water bore constructed and that 
165 Ibid [3.3]. 
'
66 Ibid [1.2]. 
'
67 Ibid [3.2]. 
168 Ibid [3.3]. 
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discharged [sic] did occur onto lands by AGL'. 169 No punitive action was taken, even 
though AOL's petroleum exploration license prohibits activities that 'cause or 
aggravate ... soil contamination' .170 Instead, AGL was ordered to 'undertake 
remediation of the site' which involved 'ripping by agricultural tyne of the affected 
area for aeration and infiltration' _m an order which also effectively destroyed 
evidence of the incident. 
It seems incongruous that the DH refused to trust the NGO and eyewitness and 
instead relied on AOL's results, which the Department had no way of knowing 
actually pertained to the dumped water. The DII's response to the incident 
demonstrates how close relations between companies and regulators can result in 
unwillingness on the part of regulators to truly serve the public interest by rigourously 
enforcing the law. 
Ill CONCLUDING REMARKS 
There is sufficient evidence to conclude that, to date, the CSG industry in both NSW 
and Queensland has enjoyed a highly facilitative regulatory environment. The 
precautionary principle has not been given substantive effect since the industry has 
continued to expand without environmental uncertainties being resolved. Instead, 
evidence of CSG project approvals suggests that regulators are unwilling to impose 
onerous ETA requirements on proponents to better measure environmental impacts. 
Adaptive management programs, where they are used, do not appear to adequately 
169 Ibid [3.5]. 
170 Instrument of Renewal of Exploration License No 267: AGL Gas Developments (Hunter) 
Pty Ltd (15 June 2006) cl 2. 
171 Ibid 3 [5]. 
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address these informational gaps, because they do not provide for comprehensive 
modeling. 
This evidence of under-regulation suggests that regulators and legislatures have 
served industry purposes at the expense of the public's interest in environmental 
protection. The CSG industry's involvement in the law reform process for the 
Queensland Water Act amendments illustrates how powerful interest groups can 
influence regulation. The problem of policy-makers becoming 'captured' by industry 
in this way is a pervasive issue identified in Australian case studies of the mining 
industry. 172 When considered in light of the unique environmental harm posed by 
CSG activity and the long-term nature of environmental harm it presents, this 
regulatory failure is particularly concerning. 
172 See, eg, Briody and Prenzler, above n 1, 54-71; Hutton, above n 1, 149-173; Gunningham, 
above n 22, 85-87. 
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PART THREE: EXPLAINING THE APPROACH Ai"'lD REFORl\/IS 
This Part is divided into two sections, the first exploring possible explanations for the 
highly facilitative regulatory approach towards the industry in the study jurisdictions, 
and the second detailing some broad recommendations for regulatory and legislative 
reform to address the problems identified in the thesis. 
I REASONS FOR THE APPROACH 
A Institutional Factors 
In the regulation of the industry in NSW, institutional factors may have limited the 
weight given to precaution in approvals and the policies informing CSG expansion. 
The preclusion of the OEH from assessment procedures for exploration until January 
2011 173 and the current weak advisory role of the Office, have meant officers with 
specialist environmental expertise have been prevented from strongly influencing the 
development of the industry. 
These arrangements are partly attributable to legislative provisions, but if internal 
policy can dictate that OEH is to have an advisory role once the industry has securely 
launched itself in the State, what was to prevent the OEH from being engaged in 
policy development for CSG from the outset? The strong possibility is that, as Wilson 
and Rachal point out, a regulatory agency is unwilling to concede authority to 'rival' 
agencies for fear that this would 'alter or degrade [the first] agency's mission'. 174 
Thus, DPI and DRE may perceive increased input from OEH as a threat to their 
mandate of promoting economic development in the NSW resources sector. 
173 Interview with senior officer, OEH (26 September 201 l). 
174 James Q Wilson and Patricia Rachal, 'Can the Government Regulate Itself?' (1977) 46 
(Winter) Public Interest 3, 10. 
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The same explanation may apply to institutional arrangements in Queensland that 
limit the authority of specialist environmental regulators. The QWC has no decision-
making authority at all, even though it, as the developer of groundwater models, 
would have the most knowledge of groundwater impacts caused by CSG activity. 
Additionally, DERM's subordination to DEEDI in relation to approval c-011ditions is 
likely to oontribute to the prioritisation of economic development over environmental 
protection in that State. 
B Agency lvfission 
Where agencies perceive their institutional purpose as facilitating primary industries 
such as mining, they are unlikely to prioritise environmental protection objectives. 175 
Although proving that regulators are captured by industry is not possible in this study, 
there is evidence of close relations between CSG companies and agencies, which may 
increase the potential for capture. 176 The informal nature of EIA via email for the 
Metgasco Kingfisher fracture in 2010 points to a familiar dynamic between the DII 
and the company. Another indicator of close involvement of the industry with 
regulators is in legislative drafting. Jn addition to Hopgood Ganim's connection to the 
drafting of the Queensland Water Act amendments, the CSG industry body, the 
Australian Petroleum and Production Association (AP PEA), is involved in developing 
policy that applies to the industry generally. 177 Such close and concentrated 
175 Briody and Prenzler, above n I, 54-7 I; Hutton, above n l, 150-1, 156-162. 
176 See, for example, Briody and Prenzler, above n 1, 54, 67. Grabosky and Braithwaite 
found strong evidence of a causal link between relational distance and conciliatory regulatory 
approaches in their study of Australian regulatory agencies: see Peter Grabosky and John 
Braithwaite, Of Manners Gentle: Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business Regulatory 
Afencies {Oxford University Press, 1986) 214-215. 
17 Interview with staff member, Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration 
Association policy (Telephone Interview, 19 September 2011). 
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involvement of other stakeholders in law reform for CSG does not appear to have 
occurred to date. It is arguable, therefore, that industry interests are disproportionately 
represented and served through their close relations with regulators, relative to other 
stakeholders. 
C ,~1utual Interests 
There is a perception amongst regulators that they and industry share common 
interests and therefore operate on 'the same side of the fence' .178 The rationale for the 
belief is that since companies seek licensing from authorities, they are motivated to 
maintain strong compliance records so that their future ventures are not jeopardised 
by dissatisfied regulators. 179 This perception may contribute to a more 
accommodating regulatory approach as companies are relied upon to behave 
responsibly towards the environment. 
This reliance on mutual interests may, however, be inappropriate in the CSG industry 
for a number of reasons. First, a pattern of takeovers has emerged, whereby small 
(sometimes foreign) CSG shelf eompanies condu<:-t exploration activities and then sell 
out to larger companies, at times leaving very poor environmental records in their 
wake.180 This means that a strategy of reliance by regulators on the reputational 
concerns of companies may be ineffective for anything other than larger production 
ventures that intend to operate well into the future. 
178 Roger Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law (Butterworths, 2nd ed, 1992) 266. 
m Interview with senior officer, DPI (DPI Office, Sydney, 9 September 2011). 
180 Jordan, Clarke and Flint, above n 148, 26. 
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Second, even if companies share a mutual interest with regulators in legal 
compliance, this does not necessarily mean they are concerned 'With the wider public 
interest, which regulators are ultimately tasked with serving. 181 If environmental 
protection legislation is inadequate, legal compliance docs not necessarily equate to 
protection of the public interest - that is, environmental laws may be easily complied 
with because they are inconsequential. The inadequacy of legislation becomes a 
problem when private business interests do not coincide with those of the public, 
because companies will not 'selt:regulate' to serve the public interest. 182 
Companies are particularly unlikely to be concerned with the long-term public interest 
because of the low likelihood of liability being successfully imposed on them for 
harm they cause in the long-term. Given that many of the industry's most serious 
environmental in1pacts may only be realised in the long-term future, 183 reliance on 
companies to act responsibly towards the environment with respect to long-term 
impacts may be imprudent. 
D Expertise and Resources 
Accommodating policies are not necessarily adopted solely because of close relations 
or perceived mutual interests between industry and regulators. Rather, regulators may 
lack the expertise and resources to effectively manage CSG activity, and so take a 
back seat, placing considerable trust in companics. 184 As Cotterrell has noted in the 
context of regulation more broadly, when new technologies and industry practices 
181 Lodge, above n 14. 
m Neil Gunningham and Joseph Rees, 'Industry Self-Regulation: an Institutional 
Perspective' (1997) 19(4) Law and Policy 363, 390, 406. 
183 NWC, above n 9, 3. 
184 Cotterrell, above n 178, 269. 
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emerge, there may be insufficient expertise for 'determining issues of causation, of 
allocation of responsibility, and of culpability' .185 These problems can be manifested 
in a lack of proactive law refonn to address the new problems posed by the industry. 
An example is DERM's response to an accidental connectivity between the Springbok 
Aquifer and the \Valloon Coal Measures in Queensland caused by fraccing. 186 The 
company involved failed to inform DERM of the incident for over a year, yet due to a 
lack of appropriate law, DERM has to date been unable to identify a legal breach. 187 
Jn relation to understaffing, a departmental officer from NSW's DRE suggested that 
limited resources within OEH were the primary factor for it not taking a greater role 
in CSG regulation.188 However, since agencies depend heavily on government support 
to fulfill their mandate, 189 the underlying cause of poor resourcing may be political. 
E Political Influence 
The widespread political support for the CSG industry is possibly the most important 
factor in the facilitative approach of regulators and the lack of comprehensive Jaw 
reform to address environmental uncertainties. The CSG industry has the strong 
political backing of both major parties in NSW and Queensland. Political leaders have 
also taken an active role in defending its reputation. In August 2011, the Queensland 
Premier downplayed the seriousness of the detection of benzene at six to 15 times 
!85 Ibid. 
lSii Email from DERM to Charlotte Hanson (30 September 2011) 
187 Ibid. Licensing conditions for CSG Environmental Authorities now include a requirement 
for operators to take immediate rectification measures if theeing causes connectivity between 
an aquifer and a coal seam: see, eg, Environmental Authority: DERAf Permit Number 
PEN101253210 QGC Pty Ltd (l 1July2011) cl no. 
188 Interview with senior officer, DTIRIS (Telephone Inten~ew, 15 September 2011 ). 
189 Wilson and Rachal, above n 174, 8. 
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Australian safe drinking water levels in bores surrounding Arrow Energy's CSG 
operations, referring to the quantities as 'minute' .190 In the same month in NSW, the 
Minister for Resources and Energy claimed that a leaking gas pipe in Eastern Star 
Gas's Pilliga operations was caused by an outsider's tampering. 191 There was no 
evidence for the claim; it was based solely on the advice of the company. 192 Given the 
willingness of politicians to speak out for the industry, regulators most likely lack the 
political support to take a strict regulatory approach towards the industry. 
11 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 
It would be futile to make recommendations for improving the regulation of the CSG 
industry that are divorced from political and economic realities. Conversely, there is 
an urgent need for politicians and bureaucrats to reconeeptualise their role if the 
public's interest in environmental protection is to be served. Given these 
considerations, this section suggests that the precautionary principle should be given 
substantive force in the regulation of the industry, but if CSG development is to 
continue despite environmental tmcertainty, the application of adaptive management 
must be improved. 
A Apply the Precautionary Principle 
19° Chris 0 'Brian and Siobhan Barry, 'Bligh Downplays Carcinogens Find at CSG Site', 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 29 August 2011 <http://w'llrw.abc.net.au/news/2011-
08-29/bligh-downplays-carcinogens-found-in-csg-site/2860144>. 
191 NSW, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 2 August 2011, 3357 (Duncan Gay). 
192 Ibid. 
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-----------~~~~~~~---,__ 
The most serious regulatory failure in the development of the CSG industry is the 
rejection of the precautionary principle. Regulators should give the principle 
substantive effect by limiting CSG development until it is proved safe. 
B Legislate for Baseline Assessment 
Effective adaptive management hinges on the existence of thorough baseline 
assessments. As Holling notes, because 'the duration of a dynamic system depends on 
its starting conditions different starting conditions lead to different outcomes -
we need data that give a complete description of all variahles at some specific 
moment' .193 Baseline assessment of hydrogeological conditions is needed for all 
projects in NSW and Queensland. Assessment must occur prior to extraction of any 
water. Data must also be comprehensive; the Queensland Water Act's provisions for 
baseline assessment include both groundwater quality and quantity criteria, 194 and 
NS\V should follow suit in this regard. 
C Develop and Monitor Groundwater Models 
Comprehensive groundwater modeling and maintenance of models should occur in 
both States. The involvement of the QWC in developing a regional groundwater 
model for CSG activity in Queensland is an important first step towards better 
adaptive management, but it must be built upon. First, given the seriousness of 
potential environmental impacts that CSG projects can cause, the Commission's 
modeling should not be confined to the Surat Basin ~ it should extend to all areas of 
CSG activity. Second, groundwater impact monitoring requirements that apply for 
193 Holling, above n 16, 63. 
194 Water Acts 394(a). 
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quantity changes should extend to quality, as there is a need for information about 
how quality changes might occur. If NSW is to invoke adaptive management to 
justify individual projects, as was the case for Gloucester, it should develop regional 
models so that cumulative impacts can be properly measured. 
D Establish an Effective Independent Authority 
Due to the level of risk posed by CSG activity and the industry's highly politicised 
nature, there is an urgent need for an independent institution with decision-making 
authority to oversee the adaptive management process. Institutions tasked with 
adaptive management 'should be committed to actively learning about the 
environment, rather than merely to a particular strategy that may fail.' 195 Considering 
the propensity for approval authorities to serve industry interests, existing institutional 
arrangements, such as the preclusion of the QWC from decision-making, may mean 
decisions opposing industry expansion will not be taken. The need for independent 
regulation is particularly pressing when the level of investment by industry is high, 
because regulators with closer ties to industry may be subject to overwhelming 
pressure from companies. 
The proposed independent authority should have authority to reject projects in the 
interests of environmental protection. The research undertaken shows that the label 
'adaptive management' has served as a convenient excuse for avoiding difficult 
decisions over developments involving serious risks of environmental harm. 
However, if the public interest is to be served, the haim contemplated must not be 
'"' Iles, above n 62, 291. 
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limitless. An example of a limiting provision is in the s 74B of the EPBC Act, which 
al.lows the Federal Environment Minister to reject a proposal that is considered 
'clearly unacceptable'. If a similar provision could be invoked by an independent 
authority, projects or activities that pose too high a risk could be identified and 
rejected from the outset. 
E Reform the Liability Regime 
Environmental performance bonds should be mandatory and reflect, as accurately as 
possible, the economic value of potential environmental harm of projects. 196 In both 
NSW and Queensland bonds are required at the discretion of decision-makers. 197 A 
security of $20,000 was held by the DII for Macquarie Energy's drilling work in St 
Peters discussed in Part Two. However this may not reflect the economic cost of 
potential groundwater harm. The University of Sydney's Hydrology Research 
Laboratory has called for 'high value (in dollar terms) and long term (50 years 
minimum)' securities to be required for all CSG projects. 198 To accurately ascertain 
appropriate liabilities, those responsible for developing impact models should 
collaborate with actuarial experts to determine appropriate securities. 
These reforms would improve environmental outcomes by ensunng that the 
industry's potentially serious and irreversible environmental impacts are limited, and 
that CSG companies are held accountable for the environmental risks they take. 
196 Nari Sahukar, above n 30, 11; University of Sydney Hydrology Research Laboratory, 
above n 8, I. 
197 EP Acts 312(2); EP&A Acts 80A(6). 
198 University of Sydney Hydrology Research Laboratory, above n 8, 1. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study shows that regulation of CSG activity in NSW and Queensland to date has 
not adequately addressed the environmental threats posed by the industry. The 
regulatory failures described above bring into focus how broad problems in the 
operation of environmental law can give rise to unacceptable environmental risks. 
These problems are caused partly by the way environmental law is codified, but also 
the implementation of law by decision-makers. The precautionary principle is widely 
incorporated into environmental and planning legislation in Australia, however it is a 
broad consideration that does not mandate absolute precaution where it applies. Thus, 
decision-makers, in approving CSG projects on a wide scale across Queensland and 
NSW, do not appear to have been constrained by it. 
The notional adoption of adaptive management may, however, suggest that the 
precautionary principle still carries some substantive weight, as regulators have been 
compelled to justify CSG industry expansion in disregard of precaution. 
However, adaptive management is an insufficient answer to the legal and 
environmental problems. Legally, it has the weaker status of a policy, which means 
that it must not be applied inconsistently with the law. 199 Since the precautionary 
principle generally has the stronger status of a decision-making consideration, the use 
of adaptive management to justify project approvals without due precaution may not 
be a valid approaeh. The judicial review of the Gloucester gas field approval presently 
199 Green v Daniels, 1, 9. 
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underway in the NSW Land and Environment Court will clarify the legality of 
adopting adaptive management in this way. 
Evidence presented above indicates that adaptive management has been invoked for 
the purposes of legitimating the CSG industry rather than comprehensively addressing 
and accounting for its impacts. Invoking adaptive management to justify potentially 
irreversible environmental harm is an unprecedented strategy that is not supported by 
proponents of the technique. Further, politicians and regulators have appropriated the 
term without adequate concern for what is needed to implement it. In particular, the 
lack of authority granted to experts involved in groundwater impact modelling in 
Queensland suggests that present policy-makers are unwilling to comprehensively 
address the environmental risks posed by CSG activity by allowing science to play a 
more prominent role in regulation. 
Political support for CSG industry grovvth has likely contributed to, or even caused, 
the facilitative approach taken by regulators. Given the close relations between some 
agencies and the industry, regulators also seem to perceive their mandate as serving 
industry over the public interest. Case studies of the Australian mining sector more 
generally have revealed that capture of regulators in this way is an ongoing trend. 
Given the problems with under-regulation of mining activity explored in this thesis, a 
useful area of further study is the law enforcement policies adopted by regulators in 
relation to the CSG industry and the mining industry at large. Grabosky and 
Braithwaite's study of enforcement actions200 is limited in its depth of analysis of 
specific regulatory subjects - in the words of the authors it is a 'broad-brush' 
account.201 Their inquiry into what informs enforcement approaches could be focused 
onto a particular regulatory subject - the mining sector - and built upon to 
determine how the regulatory approach affects the conduct of regulated subjects. In 
particular, the question of how under-regulation and regulators' reliance on industry 
self-regulation affects environmental outcomes could be explored in greater depth. 
Another possible area of further study specific to the CSG industry is the 
Commonwealth's role as an approval authority for certain CSG projects. An inquiry 
into the application of the EPBC Act to the industry could address the question of 
whether Commonwealth law has been appropriately implemented. 
These inquiries, and the ones examined in this thesis, ultimately raise the fundamental 
question of whether, given the economic dependence of governments on mining 
royalties, law and policy can be reformed to mandate better environmental protection 
standards. 
200 Grabosky and Braithwaie, above n 176. 
201 Ibid 8. 
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